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Agroforestry projects have the potential to help mitigate global warming by acting as 
sinks for greenhouse gasses. However, participation in carbon-sink projects may be 
constrained by high costs. This problem may be particularly severe for projects 
involving smallholders in developing countries. Of particular concern are the 
transaction costs incurred in developing projects, measuring, certifying and selling the 
carbon-sequestration services generated by such projects. This paper addresses these 
issues by analysing the implications of transaction and abatement costs in carbon-
sequestration projects. A model of project participation is developed, which accounts 
for the conditions under which both buyers and sellers would be willing to engage in a 
carbon transaction that involves a long-term commitment. The model is used to identify 
critical project-design variables (minimum project size, farm price of carbon, minimum 
area of participating farms). A project feasibility frontier (PFF) is derived, which shows 
the minimum project size that is feasible for any given market price of carbon. The PFF 
is used to analyse how the transaction costs imposed by the Clean Development   
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol affect project feasibility.    
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1. Introduction 
Concerns over global warming have led to the establishment of markets for greenhouse gas 
emissions. The most common greenhouse gas, and the main gas emitted by burning fossil 
fuels, is carbon dioxide (CO2). Carbon trading has grown significantly since the Kyoto 
Protocol was ratified, reaching a value of US$10 billion in 2005 (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2006). 
Most transactions have occurred within the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. 
However, the focus of this study is Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which has the purpose of assisting developing countries to achieve 
sustainable development while contributing to meet the emission-reduction commitments 
agreed upon by Annex I countries
1.   The medium of exchange under this Article is the CER 
(Certified Emission Reduction), measured in tonnes of CO2 equivalents (CO2e).  
The demand for CERs will be met mostly by the energy sector, through clean technologies. 
However, tree-based systems also have a role to play, as they are a convenient way of 
reducing net emissions by sequestering CO2 from the atmosphere through the process of 
photosynthesis. Under the current rules of the CDM afforestation and reforestation (AR) are 
the only allowable means of sequestering carbon.  CERS are awarded for AR activities that 
generate  sequestration additional to a baseline (or business as usual) estimate. AR projects in 
tropical countries may involve participation of smallholders and communities or they may be 
based on industrial plantations. Smallholder projects consist of activities undertaken by 
farmers who manage small land areas and whose production system may be a mix of 
subsistence and marketable crops. Industrial plantations generally consist of monoculture of 
commercial trees for timber, pulp or fruit production. 
There is much interest in the development and environmental communities in the potential for 
small-scale carbon projects to simultaneously contribute to rural development and climate 
change mitigation.  However high transactions costs associated with smallholder participation 
is a major barrier to be overcome.  In this paper we present an economic model of the 
decision to participate in carbon sequestration projects from both a buyer and seller 
perspective, including the impact of transactions costs.  In the following section we lay out 
basic economic issues in carbon sequestration supply and transactions costs, followed by a 
model of project participation for buyers and sellers.  Section 4 includes a discussion of how 
key model parameters are constructed, including sequestration rates and payments, abatement 
costs and transactions costs.  In section 5 the simulation model is presented with the results 
shown in section 6.  Section 7 presents the concept of the project feasibility frontier and 
sensitivity analysis.  The paper concludes with a discussion of means to facilitate the 
feasibility of smallholder carbon projects based on model results, and a discussion of future 
possible extensions of the model. 
2. Carbon Sequestration Supply and Transactions Costs 
Carbon sequestration projects differ in terms of cost per unit of carbon emissions avoided or 
carbon sequestered, determined by the opportunity costs of switching land uses.They also 
differ in terms of other environmental and social benefits provided. For example, a complex 
                                                 
1 Annex I countries include the OECD countries (except Mexico and Turkey) and transition economies in 
eastern Europe. The US and Australia did not ratify the Protocol and the bulk of demand for carbon credits 
comes from Europe and Japan.    
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agroforest may represent an efficient use of family labour, provide sustenance and contain 
higher biodiversity than a monoculture of a fast-growing tree species. A large-scale 
monoculture plantation, on the other hand, may accumulate more carbon and provide 
employment, but it may provide little biodiversity and social benefits besides employment. 
These issues need to be considered by host countries when designing policies to encourage 
the adoption of carbon-sequestration projects that also provide environmental and social 
benefits.   
The supply of CERs depends on availability and costs of different technologies and resource 
endowments, and these will be partly determined by location. In Figure 1 the potential supply 
function in the absence of transaction costs (SA) represents the marginal abatement costs of 
providing different cumulative levels of emission reductions.  
For a given supply function, as determined by current technology and land availability, the 
equilibrium levels of price and quantity (QA, PA) depend on the demand function (D). The 
curve SA shows the prices that would be required to motivate different levels of abatement, or 












Figure 1. The market for CERs and the role of transaction costs 
In order to receive certification and enter the CER market, a project will have to incur various 
transaction costs in showing that it is reducing net emissions (e.g. increasing net 
sequestration). Carbon sequestered and stored in agroforestry projects needs to be accounted 
for in a way that ensures the carbon changes are real, directly attributable to the project, and 
additional to any changes that would have occurred in the absence of the project. Transaction 
costs (CT) make the supply function shift up and to the left (from SA to ST in Figure 1), hence 
reducing the size of the market. The new equilibrium point (QT, PT) represents a lower 
quantity of CERs at a higher price compared to the original equilibrium (QA, PA). If the 
transaction costs are too high, the market will not develop at all. This study focuses on the 
supply side of the market and concentrates on agroforestry projects involving smallholders.  
3. A Model of Project Participation Including Transactions Costs 
Consider a project composed of one buyer and many sellers. The Buyer is an NGO (the 
project proponent) and the Sellers are smallholders. The Sellers are paid for adopting   
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agroforestry land uses that sequester carbon above a baseline. The Buyer purchases these 
carbon offsets and sells them in the CER market. So the Buyer acts as an intermediary 
between the smallholders and the international carbon market. 
For simplicity, define a representative farmer with a given farm area a and current land use, 
call this the ‘average’ seller and assume there are n identical sellers. The representative seller 
will participate in the project if the reward received for carbon sequestration (vC) is larger 
than the opportunity cost of switching land uses (the abatement cost, vA)  plus the transaction 
cost of participating in the project (vT), The condition for seller participation is: 
T A C v v v + >  (1) 
with the three variables measured in terms of present value. The present value of carbon 





t C p C a v
− + = ∑ δ 1  (2) 
where Ct represents the expected stock of carbon above the baseline per hectare of land in 
year t, pF is the farm price of carbon and δS is the Seller’s discount rate. The abatement cost to 





t A R a v
− + = ∑ δ 1    (3) 
Where Rt represents the opportunity cost experienced in year t as a result of having switched 
land use to a tree-based system in year zero.  The transaction cost experienced by the seller is 





t T q v
− + =∑ δ 1    (4) 
Now consider the Buyer. The Buyer will implement a project if the present value of carbon 
payments received in the CER market (VC) is at least equal to the present value of payments 
to smallholders (the abatement cost to the buyer, VA) plus the transaction costs of designing 
and implementing the project (VT). The condition for Buyer participation is: 
T A C V V V + ≥  (5) 
VC is the discounted sum of payments obtained by accumulating the carbon offsets produced 
by all landholders in the project, certifying them and selling them in the CER market: 
( ) ∑
− + ⋅ =
t
t
B t C C C p a n V δ 1  (6) 
where pC is the rental price per tonne of carbon and δB is the Buyer’s discount rate. The 
abatement and transaction costs for the Buyer are, respectively:   
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( ) ∑
− + ⋅ =
t
t





t T Q V
− + =∑ δ 1  (8) 
where Qt represent the annual transaction costs. The Buyer must set the farm price of carbon 
(pF) at a level that satisfies conditions (1) and (5). This decision is influenced by the size of 
the project and the number of participants, as explained later. 
4. Constructing key parameters in the model 
  A. Projecting carbon sequestration rates and payments 
The carbon emission reduction available for credits in a given year (Ct) is only the amount of 
carbon sequestered under the project that is above the baselineThat is, only the ‘additional’ 
emissions reductions relative to the business-as-usual scenario are eligible. In any given year: 
t C t P t C C C , , − =  (9) 
Where CP,t and CC,t are the expected carbon stocks in the proposed land use and the current 
land use, respectively, in year t. If time series data on diameter and height of trees are 
available for the site, the amount of carbon sequestered by aboveground biomass can be 
estimated based on allometric equations (Brown, 2002). Alternatively, projections of carbon 
stocks can be based on models (i.e. Wise and Cacho 2005a, 2005b). 
Regarding carbon payments, to avoid the problem of permanence
2 Marland et al. (2001) 
propose the use of a rental price. The difference between the purchase and the rental system is 
that the former represents a purchase of carbon flows with redemption of payments upon 
project termination or failure (Cacho, Hean and Wise 2003), whereas the later involves a 
rental of carbon stocks with no redemption of credits required. Both systems are compatible 
with temporary CERs for AR projects under the CDM
3, but the rental system is more 
convenient for modelling purposes. 
The range of farm prices (pF) that the buyer can pay is influenced by the market price of 
carbon (pC). Here we express pF and pC as annual rental prices per unit of biomass carbon 
stored in trees. To understand the relationship between rental prices and purchase prices 
consider the present value (PV) of an asset that yields a perpetual stream of annual payments 







                                                 
2 The permanence problem arises in afforestation and reforestation projects because carbon captured in trees can 
be released upon harvest, in contrast with energy projects where an avoided emission is permanent. 
3 A temporary CER or “tCER” is a CER issued for an AR project activity which expires at the end of the 
commitment period following the one during which it was issued (UNFCCC document 
FCCC/CP/2003/6/Add.2). 
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In a perfect market the ratio Y/PV is equivalent to the rental price of the asset expressed as a 
proportion of the asset’s value. If we let the asset be a CER (expressed as a tonne of CO2) 
valued at price pCER, and consider that the process of photosynthesis converts 3.67 units of 




− − = e 1 67 . 3  (11) 
The value of the discount rate in the rental carbon market (i) depends on the rate of return 
expected by investors. For simplicity we assume the carbon market discount rate is the same 
as the Buyer’s. Therefore the value of i in (10) and (11) is calculated by converting the rate 
for discrete discounting δB into a continuous rate i = ln(1+δB). 
The CER price places an upper limit on the feasible farm price, because the Buyer would set 
pF ≤ pC even in the absence of transaction costs. The relationship between the purchase price 
and the rental price is affected not only by the discount rate but also by expected price trends. 
If the price of carbon is expected to increase in the future then the rental price will be lower 
than indicated by equation (11), because those renting will require a discount to forego the 
option of purchasing today. Conversely, if the price of carbon is expected to decrease in the 
future the rental price will be higher than indicated by equation (11). 
  B. Abatement Costs 
Abatement costs for the Seller are defined as the costs of producing one unit of (uncertified) 
carbon sequestration services, or the cost of producing one unit of biomass carbon. In any 
given location, abatement costs can be estimated as the opportunity cost of undertaking a 
carbon-sequestration activity rather than the most profitable alternative activity, or the cost of 
switching from the previous land use to the new land use, as represented in equation (3). This 
cost includes the present value of the stream of revenues foregone as a result of participating 
in the project. It may also include additional risk exposure or loss of food security arising 
from this participation (Cacho, Marshall and Milne 2003). If we ignore risk perceptions and 
other barriers to adoption that could be overcome by participating in the project, the 
opportunity cost from equation (3) is: 
t P t C t R R R , , − =  (12) 
where RC,t and RP,t are the annual net revenues of the current land use and the proposed land 
use respectively. In agroforestry systems with multiple outputs (eg. fruit, timber and spices) 
the annual revenue is the sum of the revenues obtained from the different products. In a 





j t j t P c x p y R ∑ ∑ − = , , , ,        j ∈ (1,...,J), i ∈ (1,...,i) (13) 
Where, yj,t is the yield of output j in year t, pj is the price per unit of output, xj,t is the amount 
of input i used in year t and ci is the cost of input i.    
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  C. Transaction Costs 
Williamson (1985) distinguished the costs of contracting as ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs.  These correspond with activities undertaken in the processes of achieving an 
agreement and then continuing to coordinate implementation of the agreement, respectively. 
Stavins (1995, p. 134) stated: “transaction costs are ubiquitous in market economies and can 
arise from the transfer of any property right because parties to an exchange must find one 
another, communicate, and exchange information”. In the case of carbon markets transaction 
costs tend to be high, because the property right to be exchanged is difficult to measure and 
its exact size is subject to uncertainty.  
Cacho, Marshall and Milne (2003, 2005) present a typology of transaction costs applicable to 
carbon-sink projects, largely based on Dudek and Wiener (1996). Here we aggregate their 
seven categories into five and distinguish between the costs borne by buyers and sellers 
(Table 1).    
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Table 1. Classification of transaction costs in AR projects for carbon sequestration 
 
Cost type  Buyer (Q) Seller  (q) 
 
Search and negotiation 
 
ex ante 
  WS w S 
  •  find sites, establish contact, organize 
information sessions, draft 
contracts, provide training, 
promotion  
•  establish baseline for region 
•  estimate potential C stocks and 
flows of project  
•  design individual farm plans 
•  produce PDD 
 
•  attend information sessions  
•  undertake training  





  WA w A 
  •  approval by host country (DNA) 
•  validate the project proposal (DOE) 
•  Submit to CER Board 





  WP w P 
  •  buy computers and software, 
establish office  
•  establish permanent sampling plots  
 
•  purchase tape and equipment for measuring 
trees and sampling soil 
 
  ex post 
  •  maintain database and administer 
payments 
•  coordinate field crews, pay salaries 
•  distribute payments to landholders 
•  interest costs 





  WM w M 
  •  enter data from farmer sheets 
calculate C payments 
•  process soil C samples 
•  measure random sample of plots to 
check farmer estimates 
•  verification and certification of 
carbon  (DOE)  
•  measure trees, fill in form and deliver to 
project office 
•  sample soil C 
 
Enforcement and insurance 
 
ex post 
  WE w E 
  •  maintain buffer of C  
•  purchase liability insurance  
•  settle disputes  
•  protect plot from poachers and fire 
•  participate in dispute settlement  
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The transaction costs experienced by buyers and sellers in time period t are respectively: 
t E t M t P t A t S t W W W W W Q , , , , , + + + + =  (14) 
t E t M t P t A t S t w w w w w q , , , , , + + + + =  (15) 
where the subscripts represent search and negotiation (S), approval (A), project management 
(P), monitoring (M), and enforcement and insurance (E). Using the CDM project cycle as a 
basis (Figure 2) we can relate these costs to the design and implementation of projects. 
PDD Development



















Figure 2. The CDM project cycle 
Search and negotiation costs. The CDM project cycle starts with the preparation of a Project 
Design Document (PDD). This requires the project developer to identify a suitable region; 
gather agricultural, social and economic information about the region to develop the baseline; 
identify suitable land uses and estimate their carbon sequestration potential; contact and 
establish relationships with the local people; negotiate the terms of the project and the 
schedule of payments for carbon-sequestration services; and possibly undertake 
environmental and social impact studies. These activities are included within Search and 
negotiation costs in Table 1. Estimates of these costs in the literature vary widely depending 
on the nature of the activities within the project, the scale of the project, assumptions 
regarding the presence of local NGOs and farmer groups that may facilitate the process of 
contacting local people, and the availability of local experts to design the monitoring strategy 
and prepare the PDD. 
Approval costs. Steps 2, 3 and 4 of the CDM cycle in Figure 2 fall within the Approval costs 
category. They include approval by the Designated National Authority (DNA) of the host 
country; validation of the PDD by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) accredited by the 
CDM Executive Board; and registration of the project when submitted to the Executive 
Board. The costs of these activities depend on several factors, including the institutional 
infrastructure of the host country and the availability of a local DOE that can validate the 
PDD as a cheaper alternative to an international consultant.   
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Monitoring costs. Steps 5, 6 and 7 of the CDM cycle in Figure 2 fall within the Monitoring 
costs category of Table 1. These are the costs of measuring the CO2 abatement actually 
achieved by the project, including certification and verification by a DOE. Once the CDM 
Executive Board issues the appropriate number of CERs the project developer (the Buyer) 
becomes a seller in the international carbon market. Any additional transaction costs that may 
be associated with selling CERs in the international market are not accounted for below. It is 
assumed that the project developer can access the full price per CER, although it is a simple 
matter to reduce the price by a brokerage fee if applicable. Monitoring costs are recurrent, as 
they are incurred every time a new batch of carbon is submitted for CER crediting.  
Two types of transaction costs listed in Table 1 do not fit neatly within the CDM project 
cycle; nonetheless they are necessary for the approval and operation of the project.   
Project management costs include the cost of keeping records of project participants and 
administration of payments to sellers, as well as salaries and transportation costs of project 
employees. Ex ante project management activities include the establishment of a local project 
office and the training of staff. Project management costs are not normally recognized 
explicitly in the literature on transaction costs of Kyoto mechanisms, but they are expenses 
incurred in buying and selling carbon-sequestration services, so they should be considered.  
Enforcement and insurance costs arise from the risk of project failure or underperformance, 
which might be caused by fire, slow tree growth, or leakage
4. Enforcement costs may be 
incurred in the form of litigation and dispute-resolution expenses. Insurance options may 
include purchase of an insurance policy, deduction of a risk premium from the price of 
carbon, and maintenance of buffer carbon stocks that are not sold. These activities form part 
of the risk-management strategy required within the PDD.  
  D. Empirical Estimates of Transaction Costs 
A review of published CDM transaction-cost estimates for small projects (Michelowa et al 
2003; de Gouvello and Coto 2003; Krey 2004; EcoSecurities 2003) indicates that  search and 
negotiation costs (WS) range between $22,000 and $160,000; approval costs (WA) range 
between $12,000 and $120,000; and monitoring costs (WM) range between $5,000 and 
$270,000. Only one source (EcoSecurities) presents risk-mitigation costs (1% to 3% of 
CERs), which fall under enforcement and insurance (WE). The wide range of values in all 
categories illustrates the fact that transaction costs are highly sensitive to the type and size of 
project assumed.  In addition, since the market is very recently established, there is still 
considerable variation and discussion about the rules of exchange which affect transactions 
costs. 
Useful information regarding transaction costs of projects involving smallholders is provided 
by the Scolel Te project in Southern Mexico, which has developed a management system 
called ‘Plan Vivo’. De Jong et al. (2004) outline the transaction costs associated with 
designing the Plan Vivo Management System. Under the Search and negotiation category we 
could include the costs of undertaking the feasibility study, the carbon inventories, the land-
use analysis, and the development of the regional baseline. The total cost of these activities 
was approximately $830,000. Trained technicians develop Plan Vivos in their community 
                                                 
4 Leakage occurs when the emissions reductions achieved in the project area are offset by an increase in 
emissions outside the project boundary, leading to no net reduction in emissions (or even a net increase).   
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either with individual farmers or with the community as a whole. Designing a Plan Vivo 
requires about 3 days of training by a professional technician. Salary, transport and lodging, 
are the main expenditures for training sessions, which typically cost between $400 and $500 
each (de Jong et al. 2004). 
Arifin (2005) presents estimates of the transaction costs incurred by community-based 
forestry management groups in Sumber Jaya, Indonesia. Activities identified by Arifin 
include obtaining information and joining farmer groups (search and negotiation); the cost of 
obtaining a permit to participate (approval); the cost of attending meetings (project 
management); and the costs of guarding crops and participating in dispute settlement 
(enforcement and insurance). Arifin calculated these costs as the time required to perform 
these activities multiplied by the wage rate.  
5. Implementation of a Numerical Model for Empirical Analysis 
In this section we extend our model to enable us to undertake empirical analysis of situations 
in which both buyers and sellers conditions for participating in the carbon market are met, 
including the effects of transactions costs as laid out above. The model, which is implemented 
in the Matlab environment (The Mathworks 2000), can be solved numerically for any set of 
exogenous variables. Essentially, the model consists of a set of nonlinear equations that are 
solved iteratively to find combinations of variables that satisfy project-participation 
constraints. 
In Table 2 a list of variables and their units as defined for the model is presented, covering 
various dimensions of abatement and transactions costs, returns to carbon sequestration and 
other key factors that influence project feasibility.  
The foregoing analysis, based on a hypothetical 25-year project, is used to identify critical 
project-design variables. Prices are expressed in terms of US dollars. The baseline is assumed 
to be a cassava crop with an NPV of $4,376/ha and the project activity is a damar 
agroforestry system with an NPV of $4,372/ha. The damar system is a complex agroforest 
developed by the Krui people of Lampung, south Sumatra. The system consists of a sequence 
of crops building up to a “climax that mimics mature natural forest” (ASB 2001). The main 
tree species is damar (Shorea javanica), a source of resin that provides a flow of income. 
Other outputs include fruits, pepper and firewood.  
The carbon stock of the baseline was assumed to be zero because cassava biomass is 
harvested every year and soil carbon is not accounted for. The carbon accumulation pattern of 
















,  (16)   
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Table 2. Variable definitions for project-participation model 
Variable Description  Units 
VC, vC  Carbon payments received by Buyer, Seller   $ (present value) 
VA, vA  Abatement costs experienced by Buyer, Seller  $ (present value) 
VT, vA  Transaction costs experienced by Buyer, Seller  $ (present value) 
Ct  Carbon stock above the baseline in year t tC/ha 
CP,t  Carbon stock of project activity in year t tC/ha 
CC,t  Carbon stock of current activity (baseline) in year t tC/ha 
Rt  Opportunity cost of land use change in year t $/ha 
RP,t  Net revenue of project activity in year t   $/ha 
RC,t  Net revenue of baseline in year t   $/ha 
A  Average farm area  Ha 
pF  Farm price of carbon  $/Tc 
pC  Rental price of carbon  $/tC 
pCER  Purchase price of CER  $/tCO2e 
PL  Price of labour  $/pd 
N  Number of participating farms  Farms 
δB  Buyer discount rate   (%) 
δS  Seller discount rate   (%) 
yj,t  Yield of product j in year t   units/ha 
a
 
pj  Price of product j   $/unit 
a
 
xi,t  quantity of input i in year t   units/ha 
b
 
cj  cost of input i   $/unit 
b
 
Qt  Total Buyer’s transaction costs in year t $ 
qt  Total Seller’s transaction costs in year t $ 
a output units vary (eg kg, t, m
3) depending on the type of product 
b input units vary (eg pd, kg, bag) depending on the type of input 
with parameter values α=0.5, β=471.6 and γ=0.0958.  These parameter values result in an 
average carbon stock of 89.3 tC/ha over the 25-year period of the project. This agroforestry 




































Figure 3. Simulated biomass carbon trajectory for damar in Sumatra; the hypothetical project duration is 
indicated by a dotted line   
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Transaction cost assumptions are presented in Table 3. Note that the units of measurement of 
these costs vary. In the case of the Buyer, costs can be ex-ante fixed costs ($), annual fixed 
costs ($/y), or variable costs dependent on the number of participating farms ($/farm) or on 
the size of the project ($/ha/y). In the case of the Seller, costs are expressed in terms of 
labour. The original five transaction-cost categories are disaggregated to account for variation 
in the units of measurement. The expanded classification is presented under ‘Cost type’ 
(column 1, Table 3), where number subscripts denote the different cost types. For example, 
there are three types of monitoring costs; WM1 ($/ha/y), WM2 ($/y), and WM3 (CER/y).   
Table 3 . Transaction cost assumptions in base case 
Cost 
type Activity  Cost Units 
Buyer (project manager)    
WS1  consultation and negotiation  20,000  $ 
WS1  establish baseline and C flows of project for region  20,000  $ 
WS1  design monitoring plan   5,000  $ 
WS1  prepare project design document  6,500  $ 
WS2  design individual farm plans  200  $/farm 
WA  approval by host government  1,000  $ 
WA  validate the project proposal (DOE)
a  6,000  $ 
WA  submit to CER Board (Registration fee)  *  $ 
WP1  purchase IT infrastructure, establish local office   20,000  $ 
WP2  maintain database/software and administer payments  10,000  $/y 
WP2  coordinate field crews, pay salaries  40,000  $/y 
WM1  measure C stocks in sample of farmers’ plots  8  $/ha/y 
WM2  verification and certification of carbon by DOE   10,000  $/y 
WM3  adaptation fee  0.02  CERs/y 
WE1  maintain buffer of C  0.10  CERs/y 
WE2  settle disputes   100  $/farm/y 
       
Sellers (farmers)      
wS  attend information sessions   6  d 
wS  undertake training   10  d 
wS  design farm plan  4  d 
wA  obtain permission to participate in project  4  d 
wP  attend regular project meetings  5  d/y 
wM  measure trees and report results to project office  3  d/ha/y 
wE  protect plot from poachers and fire   10  d/y 
wE  participate in dispute resolution  2  d/y 
* Registration fees vary with project size <15,000 CERs=$5,000; 15,000 to <50,000 CERs=$10,000; 50,000 to 
<100,000 CERs=$15,000; 100,000 to < 200,000=$20,000; >200,000 CERs = $30,000 
a Designated Operational Entity 
 
Monitoring costs of AR projects can be high, and designing the right monitoring strategy is 
important (Cacho, Wise and MacDicken 2004). Monitoring also involves verification and 
certification of carbon stocks by a designated operational entity (DOE). This is assumed to 
cost $10,000 per year (Table 3), but the cost could be higher if international experts are 
required or the project sites are scattered over a large area.         
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Designing individual farm plans (WS2) involves a technician visiting each farm and drawing a 
land-use change plan in consultation with the farmer. This is assumed to cost $200 per farm 
to the Buyer, which would include one or two days of a local technician’s time plus travel 
expenses. This activity would also take four days of the Seller’s time. 
Enforcement and insurance is assumed to involve maintaining a buffer of 10% of biomass 
carbon not sold as CERs, plus an average cost of $100 per farm per year to settle disputes; 
this expense would include any legal fees involved. The buffer is also a risk-mitigation 
strategy to account for leakage or the possible loss of trees.    
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Assumptions regarding prices and discount rates are presented in Table 4. The price of CERs 
is set initially at a high value ($20/t CO2) to ensure the project is feasible. 
 
Table 4. Other assumptions for base case 
Variable Value Description 
pCER  20  price of CERs ($/t CO2e) 
pC  4.28  farm price of carbon ($/t C) 
pL  1.72  price of labour ($/d) 
n  500  number of farms in project 
a  2  average area of farm (ha) 
δB  0.06  Buyer discount rate 
δS  0.15  Seller discount rate 
i  ln(1+δB)  discount rate in carbon rental market 
  89.3  mean carbon stock (tC/ha) for Damar 
  0  mean carbon stock (tC/ha) for Cassava (baseline) 
  4,372  net present value ($/ha) of Damar 
  4,375  net present value ($/ha) of Cassava (baseline) 
 
Replacing equations (4) and (8) with (17) and (18) respectively, and inserting parameter 
values in the appropriate equations, we can now solve the model and determine under what 
conditions both buyers and sellers will participate in the market; based on conditions for 
project participation (1) and (5). Experiments consist of solving the model for different values 
of pCER, pF, a and n and determining when both conditions (1) and (5) are satisfied.   
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A series of computer experiments were performed on the hypothetical project. The model is 
built upon the assumption that the project consists of n identical farms each consisting of a 
hectares. The project developer establishes individual contracts whereby farmers agree to 
change their land use from cropping to agroforestry and receive payments for the carbon 
captured in their trees. In designing the project the Buyer decides on the number of 
participants (n), the carbon price paid to farmers (pF) and other features such as monitoring 
and risk-mitigation strategies. 
6.  Model Results 
  A.  Determining the Feasible Range for Farm prices 
The first step in the numerical analysis is to determine bounds for the farm price. This 
involves finding the minimum price acceptable to the Seller (pS) and the maximum price the 
Buyer is willing to pay (pB). First, pF is set such that vC −vA=vT and the resulting value is 
called pS; then pF is set such that VC −VA=VT and the resulting value is called pB. The project is 
feasible only if pB ≥ pS, and the farm price falls within the range pS ≤ pF ≤ pB. The actual value 
of pF depends on the market power of the participants, the objectives of the Buyer and the 

































Figure 4. The feasible range of farm prices within which the project will be feasible is derived by finding 
the minimum price acceptable to the Seller in (A) and the maximum price acceptable to the Buyer in (B) 
The carbon margin for the Seller (vC-vA in Figure 4A) increases linearly with pF, whereas the 
carbon margin for the Buyer (VC-VA in Figure 4B) decreases linearly with pF. The 
intersections of the carbon margin curves with their respective transaction cost curves 
indicate the price bounds (pS, pB). Given the assumptions in Tables 3 and 4 the feasible farm 
price ranges between $0.83/tC and $1.31/tC. For simplicity we now set pF = (pS  +  pB )/2 as   
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the base price to determine the effects of other project design variables; therefore pF  = 
$1.07/tC in the base case.  
  B. Determining Minimum farm size 
In the base case we assume and average farm area of two hectares, this size is consistent with 
the average area of land granted to transmigrants in Sumatra (Grist and Menz, 1997). The 
assumptions in Table 4 imply that the project covers 1,000 ha (500 farms of 2 ha each) and 
increases the biomass carbon stock by 89,300 tC above the baseline. This corresponds to a 
total of 327,731 CERs produced by the project (89,300 tC × 3.67 tCO2/tC). Given that we are 
dealing with smallholders it is important to determine to what extent the size of participating 
farms affects the feasibility of the project. To answer this question we solve the model for a 
range of values of a, while simultaneously adjusting n to keep project size constant at 1,000 
ha (or 327,731 CERs). This operation does not affect the carbon margin but it has a 
significant effect on transaction costs for the Buyer (Figure 5). 
As farm size increases the Buyer’s transaction costs decrease at a decreasing rate and become 
relatively flat at farm sizes beyond 5 ha or so. Reducing farm size below 1 ha causes 
transaction costs to increase exponentially. The minimum farm size for the given parameters 
is 1.6 ha, which would require 625 participating farms to maintain total project area at 1,000 
ha. At this point the Buyer’s transaction costs would be approximately $2.42 million, which 
translates into $7.39/CER. By comparison, for a project with 5-ha farms (requiring 200 farms 



















Figure 5. Minimum feasible farm size is indicated by the dotted line at the intersection of the carbon 
margin (VC-VA) and the transaction costs (VT) for the Buyer (note: the number of farms decreases as farm 
size increases to keep the project size constant at 1000 ha, farm price is $1.07/tC) 
  C. Determining Minimum number of farms 
Now assume that farm size remains constant at 2 ha and the total project area can increase by 
increasing the number of contracts with farmers. In this case, as the total project area 
increases the farm price the Buyer is prepared to pay (pB) also increases (Figure 6). This is 
because, although both the carbon margin (VC-VA) and transaction costs (VT) increase with the 
increasing number of participants, the latter increases slower because the fixed cost are spread   
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among a larger number of participants. The Buyer’s price increases at a decreasing rate, from 
$0.81 to $1.91/tC as the number of farms under contract increases from 355 to 1,000; and 
total project area increases from 700 ha to 2,000 ha. In Figure 6, the minimum number of 
farms (355) is that at which the Buyer’s maximum farm price is the same as the minimum 








































Figure 6. The breakeven number of farms, indicated by the dotted line, is calculated as the point at which 
the maximum price the Buyer is willing to pay (pB) equals the minimum price the Seller is willing to 
accept (pS) 
  D. Effects of CER price 
The CER price used above ($20/tCO2e) is rather high given current market conditions, so it is 
important to determine how a lower price will affect project feasibility. In particular, it is of 
interest to evaluate how the CER price affects the critical values of pS, pB, n and a identified 
above. Essentially, this involves changing  pCER and repeating the above analysis to identify 
the points at which the Buyer’s carbon margin (VC-VA) equals the transaction cost (VT). 
Results are presented in Table 5. The middle column of results shows the base case already 
discussed, the other two columns are the results with pCER values of $25 and $15. Given the 
transaction costs assumed and the default number of farms (500) and farm size (2 ha), a pCER 
of $15 is not feasible. At this CER price the Buyer’s price (pB=0.39) is below the Seller price 
(pS=0.83). Setting the farm price pF at its lowest feasible value of $0.82/tC, we find that the 
minimum farm area with constant project size (1,000 ha) is 3.43 ha. This result (Block A in 
Table 5) is represented by downward shift of the VC-VA line in Figure 5 as the CER price 
decreases, causing the new intersection with VT to occur at a larger farm size.  
The last three rows of Table 5 (the Block labelled B) are the most interesting, because they 
show the absolute minimum possible project size (when pF = pS), or the breakeven project 
size, rather than the minimum project size with pF arbitrarily set at the mean between Buyer’s 
and Seller’s prices. The breakeven number of farms increases from 355 at a pCER of $20 to 
772 at a pCER of $15. This shift represents a doubling in project area from 710 ha to 1,544 ha 
and is equivalent to an increase in project size (in terms of CERs) from 233 kt CO2e to 506 kt 
CO2e.   
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Table 5. Effect of CER price on critical values of project-design variables 
  Price of CERs ($/tCO2e) 
  25 20 15 
Seller minimum carbon price ($/tC), pS 0.83 0.83 0.83 
Buyer maximum farm price ($/tC), pB 2.22 1.31 0.39 
Farm price ($/tC), pF 1.52 1.07 0.82 
 
A) With project area constant (1000ha):          
   Minimum farm area (ha)   1.18 1.61 3.43 
   Corresponding number of farms  846 622 291 
   Project CERs (tCO2e) 327,891 327,891 327,891 
 
B) With farm size constant (2ha) and pF=pS:          
   Breakeven number of farms   230 355 772 
   Corresponding project area (ha)  460 709 1,544 
   Project CERs (tCO2e) 150,875 232,552 506,250 
 
To put our results in perspective consider that, in May 2006, there were 176 CDM projects 
registered
5, claiming to reduce emissions by an average of 301,633 tCO2e/y. Classified by 
size, there were 71 large-scale projects with average emission reductions of 638,133 tCO2e/y 
and 78 small-scale projects claiming an average of 29,554 tCO2e/y. To convert our results 
from stocks of carbon to flows of CO2 and compare them to existing projects, note that the 
aboveground biomass carbon stock of the damar system is assumed to increase from 0 to 252 
tC/ha in 25 years (Figure 3); this represents an annual CO2 reduction of 37 tonnes 
(3.67×252/25); multiplying this value by the breakeven project areas in Table 5 we obtain 
17,020 tCO2/y, 26,233 tCO2/y and 57,128 tCO2/y for CER prices of $25, $20 and $15 
respectively. So our hypothetical project may fit within the small-scale category at a CER 
price of $20 or above. 
7. The Project Feasibility Frontier and Sensitivity Analysis 
We have seen above that smaller projects become feasible as the CER price increases. Often, 
it is convenient to express project size in terms of total CERs rather than number of farms, as 
this allows comparison with other projects, including those in the energy sector. Figure 7 
shows how the minimum project size (in terms of CERs) decreases as the CER price 
increases. This curve forms a frontier, because projects falling below or to the left of this 
curve are not feasible under the given transaction costs, whereas projects that fall above or to 
the right of the frontier are feasible. We will call this curve the project feasibility frontier 
(PFF). 
                                                 
5 http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html   
 
 
   






































Figure 7. The project feasibility frontier (PFF) 
In essence the PFF is the set of points at which the carbon margins just cover the transaction 
costs for both parties. The breakeven value of n is then converted to CER units with the 
formula:  
Project CERs = n × a (ha) × 89.3 (tC/ha) × 3.67 (tCO2/tC).   
The PFF is a convenient way of exploring the influence of land productivity, individual 
transaction costs, or any other exogenous variable on the viability of a project. A new PFF 
can be derived by changing any exogenous variable and repeating the process; thus providing 
a useful tool for sensitivity analysis. 
  A. Effect of carbon sequestration potential 
The damar system in our project is assumed to increase average carbon stock by 89.3 tonnes 
per hectare over the life of the project (25 years). But there can be considerable variability in 
the productivity of farms within the same region. Therefore it is important to determine the 
influence of carbon-sequestration potential on project viability. Figure 8 presents PFFs for 
three levels of carbon sequestration potential: the base case, a low potential (0.75 C(t)), and a 
high potential (1.25 C(t)).  
A change in carbon sequestration potential causes the PFF to shift in the opposite direction. 
When C(t) increases by 25% the PFF shifts left, so that, compared to the base case, smaller 
projects are viable at a given CER price; or lower CER prices are required to make a given 
project size viable. A decrease in C(t) has the opposite effect, and the effect is more 
pronounced. These results indicate that a reduction in actual carbon sequestered relative to 
expectations can have a major influence on the success of the project.  
   
 
 
   


































Figure 8. The effect of carbon sequestration potential on the position of the project feasibility frontier; the 
dotted line represents the base case, solid lines represent an increase (to 1.25×base) or a decrease (to 
0.75×base) in the carbon-stock trajectory 
  B. Effect of Transaction costs 
The transaction costs assumed for this analysis were presented in Table 3. These values are 
arbitrary but plausible. There is high uncertainty regarding some of these costs and thus it is 
important to evaluate their effect on project viability. This can be done by modifying the 
Seller’s transaction costs, q(t), and/or the Buyer’s transaction costs, Q(t), and solving the 
model. Figure 9 presents PFFs for three transaction-cost scenarios: the base case, low Buyer 

































Figure 9. The effect of transaction costs on the position of the project feasibility frontier; the dotted line 
represents the base case, the solid lines represent a 25% decrease in the transaction costs of the Buyer (Qt) 
or Seller (qt)  
Decreases in transaction costs cause the PFF to shift left, making smaller projects viable at a 
given CER price; or lowering the CER price required to make a given project size viable. 
Buyer’s transaction costs have a more pronounced influence than Seller’s transaction costs.   
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So reducing the transaction costs experienced by buyers should be a priority when designing 
projects, which is the subject we turn to in the following section.  
8.  Discussion: potential for improving the feasibility of smallholder carbon 
projects and future research  
  A. Potential for Reducing Transactions Costs  
The model results indicate that reducing transactions costs is an important means to increase 
the feasibility of smallholder participation in carbon markets.  In this section we outline some 
strategies by which these costs can be reduced, and the role of the public sector in facilitating 
them. 
The biggest gains in improving the feasibility of smallholder carbon sequestration projects 
may be realized by reducing the ex-ante  transactions costs the buyers face.  Reducing fixed 
costs may be expected to have greater benefits for smallholder participation, since these are 
shared over the total number of hectares in the project.   Strategies to reduce these types of 
transactions costs fall into three broad categories: 1) Increasing project size by 
fostering/building upon collective action amongst suppliers; 2) reducing contracting costs by 
utilizing existing management structures; and 3) reducing information costs through public 
provision of data, templates and guidelines. The categories are not mutually exclusive and in 
fact in many cases are complementary. 
Foster collective action. Coordinating and consolidating sequestration supply among groups 
of poor landholders is an important way to reduce transaction costs associated with 
smallholder projects and one which has received considerable attention in the literature. 
(Lipper and Cavatassi 2004; Cacho et. al. 2003; Smith and Scherr 2002; Landell-Mills and 
Porras 2002)  Examples of projects involving smallholder coordination in the supply of 
carbon services are described in Cacho et. 2003, Smith and Scherr 2002 and Orlando et. al. 
2002. In these projects the costs to buyers of identifying, contracting, and enforcing viable 
carbon sequestration opportunities among smallholders are reduced through the presence of 
an intermediary representing the suppliers, which can be an NGO, community group or 
government agency. It is important to note however, that the transactions cost facing the 
sellers can increase by participating in such group schemes, and this cost must be lower than 
the benefits that sellers derive from participation.  Several of the existing carbon smallholder 
projects were built upon some type of existing community projects, such as ongoing 
community-based natural resource management projects, particularly community forestry 
projects or farmer’s groups.  For example, the Scolel Te project was initiated with a 
stakeholder group of interested farmers drawn mainly from one farmers union operating in 
the Chiapas region. ( http://www.eccm.uk.com/scolelte/involved.html). Communities that 
already have experience in working cooperatively are likely to have lower costs of 
participation as well as dispute resolution – another important transaction cost.  
 
One potentially important area for collective action to reduce transactions costs is through 
peer-monitoring schemes.  There is anecdotal evidence that, when farmers learn the value of 
carbon biomass, they could monitor their plots at low cost.  For example, farmers in Sumatra 
are able to assess the volume of wood in their trees by sight; they are accurate within the 0.25 
m
3 increments used in the timber market (Hairia et al. 2001). In field tests undertaken by 
Delaney and Roshetko (1999), two days were required for a crew to learn inventory methods   
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for measuring carbon in agroforestry gardens in Java. This evidence suggests that training 
smallholders to identify and measure their own trees or participate in a peer monitoring 
scheme may be a good investment, since monitoring costs are a fairly significant recurring 
transaction cost. In addition self or peer monitoring systems have the potential to yield more 
accurate carbon assessments, because the accuracy of carbon measurements depends on the 
number of sampling sites (e.g. see Cacho et al., 2004). Therefore involving smallholders in 
self-monitoring could not only reduce monitoring and enforcement costs, but also achieve 
high measurement accuracy by allowing high sampling intensity at a fairly low cost. 
 
Utilize existing infrastructure/management capacity. Transactions costs associated with 
establishing local offices, purchasing IT infrastructure, maintain database/software and 
administer payments could be greatly reduced where carbon projects are implemented by 
existing public or private entities that already have some or all of the infrastructure and 
management capacity in place. Another potentially important management structure to build 
upon is conditional cash transfer mechanisms that various countries and local governments 
are involved in implementing. (See de la Briere and Rawlings 2006 for a summary) These 
programs have been implemented in a wide range of middle and low income developing 
countries and they involve linking cash payments to behaviour modification – usually in the 
area of education and health.  Important management lessons as well as the potential to use 
existing payment infrastructure can be obtained from these programs and make a significant 
reduction in fixed transactions costs facing small-scale sequestration projects. 
 
Reducing information costs.  Generating and disseminating information is one of the largest 
source of transactions costs in carbon projects:  including the establishment of baselines, 
methodologies for implementation and monitoring, as well information on buyers and sellers 
to reduce search costs.  At this point the carbon market is still quite young, so information 
costs are high as a set of rules, methodologies and baseline datasets are currently under 
development.  For example, the establishment of carbon baselines is one of the most 
expensive ex ante transactions costs, and the generation and dissemination of information by 
development agencies can have a considerable effect in reducing transaction costs. The Good 
Practice Guides of the IPCC and associated tools have reduced  the cost of developing project 
documents, in particular those for small scale projects, which allow generic parameters to be 
used to estimate carbon stocks of project activities.  Another important aspect of reducing 
information costs is the development of a set of rules and methodologies specific to small 
scale projects.  Under the CDM small-scale projects are allowed to adapt a simplified set of 
procedures including a simplified PDD. Haites (2004) states: 
 “The simplified methodologies adopted by the Executive Board for small-scale CDM projects appear to reduce 
the transaction costs for those projects enough to make such projects economically viable. Evidence as to 
whether the transaction cost per CER is higher or lower than for a regular CDM project is mixed. But indications 
of a supply of potential small-scale CDM projects suggest that the transaction costs for the simplified 
methodologies are sufficiently low to make some small projects economically viable at the current market price 
for Kyoto units”.  
This statement refers to projects in the energy sector which tend to be easier to monitor. It is 
not clear whether the same applies to AR projects. To test whether this is true the model can 
be solved using values representing the simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale 
CDM projects. Therefore it is important to obtain cost estimates for such projects for future 
analyses. 
 
Several efforts are underway to reduce buyer and seller search and negotiation costs – 
including the establishment of websites such as the Ecosystem marketplace   
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(www.ecosystemmarketplace.com) as well as websites, workshops, publications, technical 
projects, research activities and capacity building work on the part of several UN agencies 
and NGOS including FAO, GEF, UNEP, WWF, IUCN, TNC and others. 
 
  B.  Future Extensions to the Model 
The analytical tools developed in this study can be applied to address a rich variety of 
questions with relevance to policy makers and project developers. Some interesting questions 
that are not answered here, but that could be tackled by applying the model, are discussed in 
this section.   
We assumed that carbon stocks are measured, verified and certified, and the new batch of 
CERs is submitted every year, thus supplying the project with an annual income stream. 
Similarly, participating farmers receive annual payments in proportion to the stock of carbon 
they maintained during the year. Variations on these schedules are possible. For example, the 
project may certify and sell temporary CERs every five years, thus reducing monitoring and 
certification costs, but also delaying the receipt of payments and therefore increasing the need 
for credit.  
Variations on the schedule of payments to farmers are also possible. For example, the project 
could provide a larger initial payment, to help farmers cover the expense of establishing 
agroforestry in their land, followed by smaller future payments. The payment schedule would 
be designed so that the present value of the total payment is the same as it would have been 
with annual payments. The Fondo Bioclimatico carbon project in Mexico offers an example 
of this approach. In their first year of participation, farmers receive an upfront payment 
equivalent to 20% of the total amount to be accrued over 20 to 30 years. Three more 
payments of 20% are made in years 2, 3 and 5, and the final payment is made in year 10 
(Corbera 2005). This strategy requires the project developer to take on more risk because 
initial payments exceed the value of the carbon already sequestered, and this money would be 
lost should farmers abandon the project. However, the strategy also raises interesting 
possibilities. Since the Seller’s discount rate is higher than the Buyer’s, the project developer 
can increase the present value of payments to farmers, while keeping the present value of the 
project cost constant; thus providing higher incentives to farmers with no additional cost 
(although with some additional risk).  
In our analysis we assume that all participating farmers join the project in its first year, and 
that the number of participants remains constant throughout the project. In reality, the project 
may start with a few farmers and, if it is successful, grow as other farmers apply to join once 
they observe the advantages of participation. The Fondo Bioclimatico provides an example of 
this evolution (Corbera 2005). The project started in 1997 with 6 communities, 43 contracts 
and covering 77.5 ha. By 2004 the project had 33 communities, 650 contracts and covered 
845 ha. As the project has grown and fixed costs have been absorbed it has become feasible 
to allow smaller farms to participate.  
Our analysis assumes that smallholders are price-takers in a homogenous carbon market, 
however there is the potential to develop a “premium” product in the form of CERs that are 
certified for not only carbon but also sustainable development and poverty reduction. This is 
the concept behind the “gold standard certification for CERS that has been developed by an 
NGO ” http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/.  Gold standard claims that their certification often   
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leads to projects obtaining premium prices for CERs.  One important question in the 
development of these types of niche markets is the relative size of the additional transactions 
costs associated with obtaining certification as compared with the price premium obtained, 
and the overall effects on project feasibility taking into account all other relevant parameters. 
We have assumed that farms participating in a project are homogeneous. This simplifies the 
analysis by allowing us to calculate transaction costs, abatements costs and carbon payments 
for the average farm, and then multiply the results by the number of farms to obtain project-
level results. This simplification also makes it computationally feasible to derive the project-
feasibility frontier (PFF) for a large number of scenarios, thus helping us understand the 
influence of different types of transaction costs and other assumptions on the feasibility of a 
project. In deriving the PFF we implicitly assume that there are as many farms of a given area 
as needed by the project to cover transaction costs. In reality, a limited number of farms is 
available in a region and, furthermore, there can be considerable variability between farms in 
terms of size and productive capacity. Antle and Valdivia (2006) observed this variability in 
US agriculture and pointed out that it may have important implications for policy analysis of 
payments for environmental services.  
Finally, the baseline is another factor that can have significant influence on project viability, 
in terms of both opportunity cost and expected carbon stocks in the absence of the project. 
Our evidence suggests that the best strategy for achieving success is to concentrate on 
degraded lands that have low opportunity cost and low carbon stocks.  
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